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JOHN H. GARVEY
FREEDOM AND EQUALITY IN
THE RELIGION CLAUSES
The Supreme Court has been extremely puzzled about how to treat
the distribution of public benefits when the pattern of distribution
may cause individuals to alter their preferences in making con-
stitutionally protected choices. When dealing with the freedom to
choose an abortion, for example, the Court held that the Hyde
Amendment was constitutional because the government did not
interfere with freedom when all it did was offer money to make the
option it preferred (childbirth) more attractive.1 In free speech
cases, the Court has said that when the government opens up public
property or offers financial incentives to speakers it must treat all
options equally-it may not favor a particular subject or position.2
Last term, in Thomas v. Review Board, 3 the Court held that when
freedom of religion is at stake, the government has an independent
obligation to fund the option which the individual finds more at-
tractive. The case directed the state of Indiana to pay unemploy-
ment compensation to one who quit his job for religious reasons,
even though the state paid nothing to those who quit for other
personal reasons. The allocation of public funds has created similar
John H. Garvey is Law Alumni Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of
Law.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I would like to thank Thomas P. Lewis for his careful reading and
generous criticism of an earlier draft of this paper.
I Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
2 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dept. of the City of Chicagov. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972). Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
3 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981).
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problems with regard to other constitutional freedoms, such as
travel, 4 voting, 5 and parental choices about their children's educa-
tion. 6 1 think that all these cases present questions of equality rather
than freedom, and that the free exercise and abortion decisions err
on different sides of the correct principle. The proper approach is
to say, as the Court has regarding freedom of speech, that the
government need not fund protected choices, but if it does, it must
do so in a neutral fashion. If that is correct, then the question
Thomas poses is not whether Indiana had prohibited the freedom to
exercise religious belief but whether the Court, by awarding
benefits, violated the equality principle inherent in the Establish-
ment Clause.
I. THE THOMAS CASE
A. THE FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Eddie Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness, was hired to work at the
Blaw-Knox Foundry and Machinery Company in the roll foundry,
which fabricated sheet steel for a variety of uses. After he had
worked there about a year, the roll foundry was closed, and he was
transferred to a department which made turrets for military tanks.
Thomas shortly concluded that his new position required him to
work directly in the production of armaments in a way that
conflicted with religious principles he found in scripture. An ex-
amination of the other departments in the plant convinced him that
he would face a similar conflict at any other job Blaw-Knox might
offer him, the roll foundry having been closed. He asked to be laid
off, was denied, and quit after a few weeks in the turret depart-
ment.
7
Thomas then applied for unemployment compensation and
stated in his claim that he had voluntarily quit his job because of
religious convictions. Under the Indiana Employment Security
Act, benefits are denied to "an individual who has voluntarily left
4 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
5 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 94-95 (1976).
6 Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973).
Thomas v. Review Bd., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1128-29 (Ind. 1979).
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his employment without good cause in connection with the work.",,
The phrase "good cause in connection with the work" is understood
to mean a provocation attributable to the employer which makes
the decision to quit objectively justifiable. 9 One forced to work
under conditions hazardous to his health has good cause to quit;'0
one who quits because of parental obligations or transportation
difficulties does not." Thomas contended that the responsibility
for his termination really lay with Blaw-Knox, since it had closed
the roll foundry, into which he had been hired on the recom-
mendation of a fellow church member. He supported that claim by
pointing out that his application for employment stated that he was
a Jehovah's Witness and that his hobby was reading the Bible.' 2
Both the appeals referee and the Employment Security Review
Board rejected his claim. Since the circumstances of Thomas's hir-
ing did not show that he had imposed contractual conditions on his
employment, Blaw-Knox was entitled to require him to work any-
where in the plant. ' 3 The only relevant cause of Thomas's decision
to quit was his personal religious objection to working on weapons.
Even if Thomas could not squeeze within the language of the
statute, he might win by showing that the interpretation of the
"good cause" provision was unconstitutional. Sherbert v. Verner'4
offered considerable help on that score. State law there had pro-
vided that one already unemployed who refused without good
cause to accept a job could not get unemployment compensation.1 5
The Supreme Court had held that it was unconstitutional to use
that provision to deny benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who
refused to accept Saturday work for religious reasons. Such a bur-
den on free exercise could only be justified by a compelling state
8 Indiana Code § 22-4-15-1 (Burns Code Ed. 1974, Supp. 1978).
9 See, e.g., Gray v. Dobbs House, Inc., 357 N.E.2d 900, 903-05 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976);
Lewis v. Review Board, 282 N.E.2d 876, 882-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Geckler v. Review
Board, 193 N.E.2d 357, 359 (Ind. 1963).
10 Evans v. Enoco Collieries, 96 N.E.2d 674 (Ind. App. 1951).
11 Gray v. Dobbs House, Inc., note 9supra.
12 Thomas v. Review Bd., 381 N.E.2d 888, 889 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
13 Id. at 890. It would be hard to blame the company for not foreseeing the turn Thomas's
conscience would take. His friend, a Jehovah's Witness, who had helped him get the job,
had no scruples about working in the turret department. Ibid.
14 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Is S.C. Code § 68-114(3)(a), quoted in 374 U.S. at 400 n.3.
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interest,' 6 and the review board in Thomas had conceded that it
could not meet that test.' 7 The Indiana Court of Appeals found the
analogy to Sherbert persuasive and overturned the review board's
decision.'8
The Indiana Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the board's
decision. It found Sherbert inapplicable because Thomas's decision
to quit was a "personal philosophical choice rather than a religious
choice."'19 According to the court, the line between fabricating steel
in the roll foundry and using the fabricated steel to make turrets
was a rather fine one, and Thomas had neither articulated the
religious basis for the distinction nor shown that other members of
his congregation subscribed to it.20 The court also held that pay-
ment of benefits to Thomas would violate the Establishment Clause
because the purpose and effect of such action would be protection
of religious belief. 2 '
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
The Chief Justice began his opinion for the Court by saying that
Thomas's reasons for quitting were unquestionably religious in the
sense required for protection by the free exercise clause. It did not
matter that Thomas found a difference of principle between two
different stages in the production of weapons. "[R]eligious beliefs
need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to
others in order to merit First Amendment protection. ' 22 Nor was it
significant that his interpretation of scripture was not shared by
other members of his faith. The guarantee of free exercise is not
limited to doctrines that command universal assent within a sect;
and where there is disagreement, courts are not competent to say
who is right.
Up to that point, the Court was on safe ground. The trouble
started when it addressed the second issue: whether the mere denial
of unemployment compensation to one who quit his job for reli-
16 374 U.S. at 406.
'7 381 N.E.2d at 890-93.
18 Id. at 888.
'9 391 N.E.2d at 1131.
20 d. at 1131-33.
1Id. at 1134.
22 101 S. Ct. at 1430.
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gious reasons counted as a prohibition of freedom of religion. The
Chief Justice began with the unimpeachable observation that "the
Indiana law does not compel a violation of conscience."'23 But having
said that, he went on to find a2 4
coercive impact on Thomas ... indistinguishable from Sherbert.
... Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit
upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies
such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief,
thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify
his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion
exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement
upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.
He even quoted the parallel that Sherbert found most apt to describe
the nature of the coercion:2 5
"Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind
of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine
imposed against [her] for her Saturday worship."
The outcome of the case followed inexorably, once that problem-
atic assumption was made. If the mere failure to pay benefits was
"coercive," an "indirect compulsion" indistinguishable from a fine,
then the state would need compelling reasons to justify such a
severe restriction of free exercise. The board had offered no proof
that the number of people who voluntarily quit jobs for religious
reasons would be sufficiently great to imperil the solvency of the
state's unemployment fund. Nor was there any showing that the
number would be large enough to prompt employers to probe the
religious beliefs of their job applicants and hire only those whose
principles were compatible with the nature of the employer's busi-
ness.
Having concluded that Indiana's law restricted religious free-
dom, the Court faced a third issue: whether paying benefits to
Thomas while denying them to those who quit jobs for personal
but nonreligious reasons would foster religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause. That contention, too, had been advanced and
rejected in Sherbert v. Verner, and the majority found no reason to
disturb its earlier holding that an accommodation of religious free-
23 Id. at 143 1.
24 Id. at 1432.
25 Id. at 1431, quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 404.
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dom did not amount to an impermissible involvement of religious
with secular institutions.2 6
Justice Rehnquist dissented. He concluded that the Court's
broad reading of the Free Exercise Clause created an irreconcilable
conflict with the Establishment Clause. If Sherbert and Thomas stand
for the principle that the government cannot put pressure on reli-
gious belief by withholding monetary benefits, it might equally be
argued that "a State may not deny reimbursement to students who
choose for religious reasons to attend parochial schools."' 27 On the
other hand, if we adhere to the three-part test currently used to
enforce the Establishment Clause, Indiana would be constitutionally
forbidden to legislate the result that Sherbert and Thomas require. In
the first place, a law allowing benefits to those who quit jobs for
religious reasons (while denying them to those who quit for other
personal reasons) would serve a religious, not a secular, purpose.
Second, the primary effect of such a law would be to advance
religion by funding the exercise of religious choices. Third, the law
would invite entanglement, because it would require the state to
investigate the religious nature and sincerity of a claimant's belief.
II. THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM: RESTRICTION OF CHOICE
The basic mistake that the Court made in both Thomas and
Sherbert was to assume that the failure to pay unemployment com-
pensation burdened the free exercise of religion. In fact, a proper
understanding of the freedom protected by the Constitution shows
that neither case involved any restriction on liberty at all.
A. A COMMON SENSE LOOK AT FREEDOM, CHOICE, AND MOTIVE
What distinguishes constitutional freedoms (such as speech and
religion) from other constitutional rights (such as the right to a jury
trial and the protection against cruel and unusual punishment) is
that freedoms give protection to choices. Freedom of speech pro-
tects the choice to praise the president, the choice to condemn him,
and the choice to keep silent. The Seventh Amendment, in con-
trast, does not protect the choice to try one's case without a jury.
26 101 S. Ct. at 1433. Justice Blackmun concurred in the opinion on the first two points
and in the result on the third-the establishment question. Ibid.
27 Id. at 1435 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The government may act in a number of ways to affect the
outcome of the process of choice. 28 (1) It might compel an indi-
vidual to choose the option that the government prefers, under the
threat of fine or imprisonment for noncompliance. 29 (2) It might
forbid or deter choice of the option that the individual prefers,
either by making that option a criminal offense or by increasing
the cost of the preferred option without making it illegal. 30 (3) The
government might try to induce (rather than compel) choice of the
option that it prefers by offering a monetary reward or similar bait
to those who comply. 31 (4) Finally, the state might discourage
(rather than forbid or deter) choice of the option that the individual
prefers by withholding monetary or other benefits that the indi-
vidual desires to receive. The last was the type of state action
involved in Sherbert and Thomas.32
28 In addition to the four examples which are discussed in text, the government may also,
though it seldom does, simply prevent exercise of a preferred choice by making it impossible.
One example might be locking the individual up in advance of his action. A second example
outside the free exercise context might be laws which prevent a candidate's name from
appearing on the ballot, thereby preventing the voter's freedom to choose that individual as
his representative and the candidate's freedom to run for office. See text at notes 46-48 infra.
In these cases the individual's action (going to jail, staying off the ballot) is not voluntary,
much less free, see text at note & note 33 infra, because he could not choose to do otherwise.
29 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), is an example. The state of Wisconsin
required parents to send their children to public or private school until they reached age
sixteen. Violation was punished by fine or imprisonment. High school attendance violated
the tenets of the Old Order Amish religion. See also West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
30 An example of a law forbidding a choice preferred by the individual is the federal
bigamy statute upheld in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The law made
bigamy a criminal offense; the defendant, a Mormon, was required by his religion to practice
polygamy. An example of a law deterring a preferred choice without making it illegal is the
license tax invalidated in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). The ordinance
there required religious colporteurs to pay a flat fee for doing what they thought was a
religious duty. Cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
The essential difference betveen case 1 (compelling) and case 2 (forbidding or deterring) is
that in the former the individual must undertake the specific activity favored by the govern-
ment (go to school, salute the flag) or be subjected to sanctions. In the latter case the
individual is free to pursue any option except the one disfavored by the government.
Reynolds was free, as far as the government was concerned, to remain unmarried or to get
married only once. Murdock was free in the same sense to distribute tracts free of charge, to
convey his message orally, and so on.
"1 The Hyde Amendment is a good example. See note 1 supra. A challenge to it on
free exercise grounds was dismissed in Harris v. McRae for lack of standing, note 1 supra,
at 320-21.
32 The difference between case 3 (the Hyde Amendment) and case 4 (Thomas) is that a
pregnant woman can, by the choice she makes, control whether she will get benefits or not.
Thomas, on the other hand, had no choice open to him which would produce governmental
benefits. He could only elect between keeping his job (and drawing wages paid by Blaw-
In cases 1 and 2, the individual will do what the government
wants him to voluntarily but not freely. His action is voluntary in
the sense that he chooses to do it; it is unfree in the sense that his
choice results from a motive that he wishes were not affecting him.
Suppose it is a religious holy day and I want to go to church.33 I may
nevertheless choose not to if (1) the state will penalize me for skip-
ping school; or if (2) the state will penalize me for going to church,
though I may do whatever else I want. In either case, I could do
otherwise, if I chose to. My decision not to go to church is not a
reflex action such as a knee jerk, or a simply physical reaction such
as being pushed into someone in front of me, but one I have willed
to do after weighing my distaste for sanctions against my desire to
conform to my religious obligations. In that sense, my action is
voluntary. But it is unfree because the state has influenced the out-
come of my choice of actions by supplying me with a motive (fear of
sanctions) which I would not choose.
From a common sense way of speaking, however, in cases 3 and 4
the individual acts both voluntarily and freely. In both cases, his
action results from choice, so it is voluntary. In both cases, his
action is also free, because it either proceeds from a motive that he
was happy to have the state supply (case 3), or it proceeds from
motives that are unaffected by state action (case 4).34 Suppose that I
want to go to the movies this afternoon. I may choose not to go
because (3) you offer me a free ticket to the Cubs game, or because
(4) I have used up all my paid vacation and would have to take the
Knox) and quitting (without compensation of any kind). To use the standard metaphor, the
government influences the pregnant woman's choice by offering her a carrot; it influences
Thomas's choice by failing to offer him a carrot.
a3 My use of the word "voluntary" follows MOORE, ETHICS 12-16 (1912). In using the
word "motive" I refer to the individual's disposition or desire to achieve or avoid a certain
end. The desire to acquire money and the fear of going to jail are two types of motives, which
the state may cause to arise in an individual by inducement or threat. Though motives may
determine one's choices, so that he generally does what he wants to do, a motive itself may be
one he does not desire. My use of "motive" also parallels Plamenatz's usage in his CONSENT,
FREEDOM AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION 111-13, 118, 122 (2d ed. 1968). With this stipulation
I hope I can avoid the controversy about the respective meanings of "reason," "motive," and
"intention." For an introduction to the literature on that subject, see RAZ, PRACTICAL
REASONING (1978); H. MORRIS, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 158-230 (1961).
34 Cf. Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, XIV NOMOS: COERCION 16 (1972): Gert, Coercion and
Freedom, id. at 30; PLAMENATZ, note 33 supra, at 122. For a contrary view that enticement
may be coercive, and hence restrict freedom, see Held, Coercion and Coercive Offers, XIV
NoMos: COERCION at 49. The fault of Held's analysis is that she relies on examples which
may be explained more appropriately as denials of equality than as limitations of freedom. Id.
at 56-57. See text at notes 53-66 infra.
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afternoon off without pay. In case 3, the motive that determines my
choice not to go to the movies is one that I want to have affecting
me. I value a movie for which I have to pay at less than I value a free
baseball game, and if it were in my control I would choose to have
you offer me a ticket to the game. I may be unhappy that you did
not also offer me a free movie pass (since I might then have gone to
the movies rather than to the game), but I undoubtedly see myself
as, if anything, more free than I would have been if you had done
nothing. In case 4, my choice would not be affected by the fact that
other employees still had vacation coming to them and could take
the afternoon off with pay. The question for me would still be
whether I valued a movie more or less than I valued an afternoon's
wages. I might be unhappy that I too could not get paid while going
to the matinee, but the reason I do not have that option is that I
have just spent a week at the beach.
What is true of that innocuous illustration is equally true if we
adapt it to religious choices. Thomas is no less free if he wants to go
to church (instead of the movies) and the government offers him
$100 to do something else. He is also no less free to do what his
conscience directs if he wants to quit and others who have "good
cause" to quit get unemployment benefits (instead of paid vacation).
He is free in the former situation because a bounty of $100-unlike
a tax, a fine, or a jail term-provides a motive he wants to have
affecting him. His choices are enhanced, rather than restricted, by
the government's action. He is free in the latter situation because
his choice to exercise his belief is unaffected by the fact that the
state pays benefits to others who quit for good cause. The govern-
ment has neither restricted his choices nor supplied him with any
motive that affects his decision.
There are several points about the problem in Thomas that seem
to distinguish it from the moviegoer in case 4. One obvious dif-
ference is Thomas's need for unemployment benefits. It is certainly
easier to take off an afternoon without pay than it is to quit one's job
with no assurance of another source of income. And as Franklin D.
Roosevelt once said, "Necessitous men are not free men."35 But
that suggests that Indiana would violate Thomas's freedom of
religion if it had no unemployment compensation system
whatsoever-or, to turn it around, that the state must act to make
35 Message to Congress, 90 Cong. Rec. 57 (1944).
202 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
people free by assuring the satisfaction of their basic needs. That
suggestion, for all its humanitarian appeal, is one I am sure the
Court did not intend to make.
A second argument-one which makes Thomas look more like
case 2 (in which the state increases the cost of the individual's
preferred option)-might be that Thomas was more entitled than
was the hypothetical moviegoer to income while he was not work-
ing. As one's entitlement becomes more secure, the state's refusal to
pay looks more like a debit than a lost opportunity. And one who
holds a job against his religious principles then is not free in the
sense that his action is determined, as in case 2, by a motive that he
does not desire: loss of "his" benefits if he quits. The Court would
then be correct in saying that "Governmental imposition of such a
choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of
religion as would a fine imposed aginst appellant .... ",36
Of course, in a positivistic sense, Thomas had no more claim to
benefits than I would have to an extra vacation day to attend the
movies. Had he asked a good lawyer before quitting whether his
reason satisfied Indiana's "good cause" requirement, he would have
been told no. On the other hand, Blaw-Knox's contribution to the
unemployment fund was made possible by the value of Thomas's
services and might in other circumstances have passed to him in the
form of higher pay and resultant higher private savings to sustain
himself after he quit. Thus, it could be argued that by operating its
unemployment compensation program, Indiana took away from
Thomas money that he needed to exercise his religious belief. Now
that he has quit, Indiana has to give it back.
That sort of argument will not work for a number of reasons.
One is that it rests on an inaccurate factual assumption. Indiana's
unemployment compensation scheme was an insurance program,
and the size of the premiums paid in on Thomas's behalf might be
considerably smaller than the amount of benefits he was claiming.37
A second reason is that the argument rests on assumptions of cau-
sation that in many cases will prove unjustified: if Indiana had not
enacted an unemployment insurance program, Blaw-Knox may
36 101 S. Ct. at 1431, quoting Sherbert v. Verner, note 14supra, at 398, 404.
37 Cf. Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960). ("To engraft upon the Social Security
system a concept of'accrued property rights' would deprive it of the flexibility and boldness in
adjustment to ever-changing conditions which it demands.")
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have kept the extra money rather than passed it on, or the job
market may have been so changed by the lack of employment secu-
rity that Thomas would have gone to work somewhere else in the
first place. In case 2, the state's action is keyed to the protected
choice; an effect on motives is guaranteed by the way the law is
designed to operate. The state says, for example, that if you want to
ring doorbells to sell religious literature (or pots and pans), you
must pay a fee for a license.3 8 In Thomas, the state's act of collecting
unemployment insurance may not play any role at all in Thomas's
later choice about quitting.
B. A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON FREEDOM,
CHOICE, AND MOTIVE
If what the preceding section says were to be reflected in con-
stitutional law, one would be left with the uneasy feeling that the
state could rid itself of Hare Krishnas, Moonies, and, for that mat-
ter, Jehovah's Witnesses by an appropriately cunning fiscal policy.
In this section, I would like to make two points: first, that the
common sense view of freedom (choice proceeding from a motive
which either is actively desired or is unaffected by state action)
finds support in cases defining constitutional freedoms; and second,
that cases that seem to reject that view in fact point toward a
different limit on the government's power to buy out Jehovah's
Witnesses-the principle of equality.
Support for the common sense view of freedom is most fre-
quently found in cases, like case 3 above, in which the government
attempts to induce choice of the option that it prefers by offering a
monetary reward or similar bait to those who comply. Funding for
childbirth, but not for abortion, is the best current example. Like
the freedoms of speech and religion, the aspect of due-process lib-
erty recognized in Roe v. Wade39 offers protection for choice-in
this case the choice whether to bear a child. Yet in Harris v. McRae,
the Supreme Court said that that freedom of choice was not im-
pinged on by a Medicaid system which paid for childbirth but not
abortion, because a woman's choice was not restricted. 40 The foun-
38 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, note 30supra, at 105.
39 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40 448 U.S. at 316-18.
dation for that conclusion was laid three years earlier in Maher v.
Roe, which found 4 1
a basic difference between direct state interference with a pro-
tected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity
consonant with legislative policy. Constitutional concerns are
greatest when the State attempts to impose its will by force of
law; the State's power to encourage actions deemed to be in the
public interest is necessarily far broader.
That difference between case 1 (compelling) or case 2 (forbidding),
on the one hand, and case 3 (inducing), on the other, exists because
in the case of inducement the woman acts from a motive she de-
sires. The state has influenced the woman's decision by "ma[king]
childbirth a more attractive alternative, . . . but it has imposed no
restriction on access to abortions that was not already there."'42 The
pregnant woman might be happier if the state also offered to fund
abortions, but "it simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of
choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial
resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices. '43
The common sense view of freedom is also reflected in cases, like
case 4 above, in which the state discourages choice of the option the
individual prefers by withholding benefits the individual desires to
receive. Consider the challenge to public financing of presidential
election campaigns in Buckley v. Valeo. 44 The plaintiffs complained
that Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code, 45 by restricting the
public subsidy available to minor and new parties in primary and
general election campaigns, infringed various freedoms that have
41 432 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1977) (footnote omitted).
42 Id. at 474.
43McRae, note I supra, at 316. The Court reached a similar conclusion in Norwood v.
Harrison, note 6 supra, at 455, regarding another aspect of due process liberty. Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), held that the Fourteenth Amendment protected a
parent's freedom to choose private, rather than public, education for his child. Obviously the
state makes choice of a public education more attractive by paying the bill. The appellees in
Norwood argued that such an inducement violated the Equal Protection Clause by dis-
criminating against those who exercised the freedom recognized in Pierce, and that Missis-
sippi was constitutionally required to provide free textbooks to private school students. The
Court said, "It is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private
schools and quite another to say that such schools must, as a matter of equal protection,
receive state aid." Note 6 supra, at 462.
44 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
45 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-12, 9031-42 (1970, Supp. IV). Section 6096 provided for designa-
tion of income tax payments to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund.
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been secured in voting cases under the Equal Protection Clause:
the voter's freedom to choose a representative of his interests, the
voter's freedom of political association, 4 6 and the candidate's free-
dom to run for office.4" The Supreme Court held that there was a
difference between withholding benefits (case 4), on the one hand,
and laws that actually prevented a candidate's name from appearing
on the ballot.48
[The latter are] direct burdens not only on the candidate's ability
to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice prefer-
ences regarding representative government and contemporary
issues. In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presi-
dential candidates is not restrictive of voters' rights and less re-
strictive of candidates'. Subtitle H does not prevent any candi-
date from getting on the ballot or any voter from casting a vote
for the candidate of his choice; the inability, if any, of minor-
party candidates to wage effective campaigns will derive not
from lack of public funding but from their inability to raise
private contributions.
Such cases suggest that the common sense view of what counts as
a restriction on freedom is one the Supreme Court has adopted
when enforcing constitutional liberties. 49 There are, though, even
more decisions that seem to point in the opposite direction-to say
that the distribution of public benefits either to induce or to dis-
courage a particular result of a protected choice counts as an inter-
ference with constitutional freedom. Let me refer to three groups of
such cases, all like Thomas (and case 4 above), in which the state has
46 See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,729(1974);
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974); Developments in the Law, Elections, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1111, 1134-36 (1975). The right to vote itself, though not explicitly denominated a
"freedom" in the Constitution, offers protection for choice. A voter may not only vote for the
candidate he chooses but is free (unlike voters in Belgium, for example) not to vote at all.
17 Buckley, note 5 supra, at 94. The candidate's interest is not of a stature sufficient to
provoke a strict standard of review. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972).
48 424 U.S. at 94-95 (footnote omitted). Keeping a candidate's name off the ballot is a case
of preventing, see note 28 supra, rather than compelling (case 1) or forbidding (case 2). It is a
more drastic interference with freedom than either of those cases since the individual's action
is involuntary.
49 One possible difference between Thomas and cases like Harris v. McRae and Buckley
might be that in Thomas the choice favored by the petitioner is seen as a matter of duty,
whereas the choice to have an abortion, to run for office, and so on are not usually viewed in
that light. There surely is something morally repugnant about intentionally tempting some-
one to violate or discouraging someone from following a moral or religious obligation. Cf.
Bayles, Limits to a Right to Procreate, in HAVING CHILDREN 13, 15 (O'Neill & Ruddick eds.
1979).
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discouraged choice of the option the individual prefers by with-
holding public benefits the individual desires. First are the so-called
right-to-travel cases, which in fact involve the freedom to migrate
from one state to another. 50 The Supreme Court has blocked state
efforts to discourage migration by withholding such public benefits
as welfare5' and medical care. 52 Second is a cluster of cases involv-
ing government employees, in which the state affects choices con-
cerning free speech, association, or even free exercise 53 by refusing
to put on the public payroll people who will not take a loyalty
oath54 or subscribe to some other orthodoxy. 55 In all of the cases
referred to, the Court has invalidated the conditions on public em-
ployment. Third are the public forum cases, in which the Court has
forbidden states to fiddle with religion5 6 or speech57 by closing the
streets, parks, and so on to advocates of disfavored positions or
subjects.
I want to suggest that, far from undermining the concept of
freedom for which I have been arguing, these cases show that the
manipulation of public benefits produces problems of equality, not
freedom. In the first place, each of the three groups of cases (travel,
conditions on employment, public forum) resolves an issue that
50 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, note 4 supra, at 250, 254; Shapiro v.
Thompson, note 4 supra, at 618, 629, 630.
51 Shapiro v. Thomson, note 4supra. Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
52 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, note 4supra.
53 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). Cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
54 Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964);
Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
55 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
56 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67
(1953); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). Last term, in Heffron v. International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981), the Court upheld a time, place,
and manner regulation of religious solicitation at the Minnesota state fair, relying heavily on
the "nondiscriminatory" nature of the rule. See id. at 2562, 2564.
57 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
If there is such a thing as an absolute right to some minimum access to the public forum,
these cases resemble case 2, text at note 30 supra, rather than case 4-the state does not
simply withhold something the individual desires but deprives him of something he has. To
date, the Supreme Court has kept its own counsel about the degree to which access is
unconditionally guaranteed. See Carey v. Brown, note 2 supra, at 455, 459 n.2 (1980); Cox v.
Louisiana, note 57 supra, at 555. Cf. United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Associations, 101 St. Ct. 2676, 2683-87 (1981).
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does not fit the traditional legal (and common sense) view of free-
dom. The roots of the freedom to migrate are found in older cases
outlawing taxes and criminal penalties (case 2) imposed to inhibit
interstate travel. 58 But, as Justice Rehnquist pointed out, a dura-
tional residence requirement59
raises no comparable barrier. Admittedly, some indigent persons
desiring to reside in Arizona may choose to weigh the possible
detriment of providing their own nonemergency health care
during the first year of their residence against the total benefits to
be gained from continuing location within the State, but their
mere entry into the State does not invoke criminal penalties. To
the contrary, indigents are free to live within the State....
Similarly, the Court for a long time resolved government employee
cases by saying that imposing conditions on employment did not
interfere with constitutional freedoms. In Justice Holmes's epig-
ram:
6 0
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are
few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to
suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of
idleness by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot
complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are
offered him.
Holmes resolved the public forum cases in the same way, uphold-
ing the conviction of a preacher who spoke on the Boston Com-
mon without getting a permit from the mayor: 61
'1 See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160 (1941).
51 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, note 4 supra, at 250, 283 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
ro McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892).
For later adoptions of the position, see Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492
(1952) ("If they do not choose to work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs
and associations and go elsewhere. Has the State thus deprived them of any right to free
speech or assembly? We think not."); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 59 (D.C. Cir.
1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) ('The First Amendment guaran-
tees free speech and assembly, but it does not guarantee Government employ.").
61 Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895), aff'd, 167 U.S.
43 (1897). Cf U.S. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations, note 57
supra, at 2676, 2685 ("The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.")
(quoting Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 [1966]).
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For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement
of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a
private house to forbid it in his house.
In the second place, the Court's recent opinions condemning the
manipulation of public benefits make clear that the evil of the prac-
tice is not that it restricts freedom but that it constitutes a denial of
equal protection. That conclusion is most evident in the right-to-
travel cases, in which the basis for decision was the Equal Protection
Clause. The principle at stake was nondiscrimination: "Ye shall
have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for one of your
own country." '62 The same is true of the public forum cases, where
the Court has recently made explicit what was implicit from the
beginning: that "under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention
the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a
forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to
those wishing to express less favored or more controversial
views."' 63 Even before that doctrinal shift, it was well understood
that the vice of vagueness in a permit system was the invitation it
offered for discriminatory enforcement. 64 One finds less conscious
recognition that the equality principle is at work in the government
employment cases, although there are clear signals. 65 Just as re-
vealing is the frequent reliance here, as in the public forum cases, on
62 Memorial Hospital, note 4supra, at 261 (quoting Lev. 24:22);Shapiro, note 4supra, at 627
(the statute "creates a classification which constitutes an invidious discrimination denying
them equal protection of the laws").
63 Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, note 2 supra, at 92, 96; Carey v. Brown, note
2 supra, at 455. Cf. Cox v. Lousiana, note 57 supra, at 557-58 (opinion of the Court), 581
(Black, J., concurring); Fowler v. Rhode Island, note 56 supra, at 67, 70 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Niemotko v. Maryland, note 56 supra, at 268, 272 (opinion of the Court), 284
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
64 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, note 57 supra at 153; Cox v. Louisiana, note 57
supra, at 557-58; Edwards v. South Carolina, note 57 supra, at 236-37; Kunz v. New York,
note 56 supra, at 293. Cf. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, note
56 supra, at 2564 ("Nor does Rule 6.05 suffer from the more covert forms of discrimination
that may result when arbitrary discretion is vested in some government authority.").
6- Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, note 54supra, at 288 ("xdusion... is patently...
discriminatory"); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. at 492-94 (Establishment Clause); Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S., 183, 191-92 (1952) ("Congress could not 'enact a regulation provid-
ing that no Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal
employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work.' . . . We need not
pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say
that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a
statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.").
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the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth. 66 Once again, the con-
cern over such defects is prompted by the opportunity they provide
for discriminatory enforcement-the appropriate sin for statutes
nearly always aimed at political minorities.
III. EQUALITY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
I have argued in Section II that when the government
influences constitutionally protected choices by the way it distrib-
utes benefits, the problem is one of equality, not freedom. 67 Taking
that perspective on the Thomas case, obviously I suggest a different
outcome: Jehovah's Witnesses were treated no differently under
Indiana's scheme than were any other employees who voluntarily
quit, so Thomas had no greater claim to unemployment compensa-
tion than did anyone else who quit for personal reasons. Not only
did the case involve no interference with freedom, but also there
was no issue of inequality that would justify judicial intervention.
In fact, by deciding Thomas as it did, the Court engaged in a kind
of "affirmative action" which may have violated the brand of
equality demanded by the Establishment Clause."6 I would like to
66 Whitehill v. Elkins, note 54supra, at 62 ("overbreadth ... makes possible oppressive or
capricious application"); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, note 54 supra, at 597-604 (vague-
ness), 609 (overbreadth); Baggett v. Bullitt, note 54 supra, at 369-74 (vagueness); Cramp v.
Board of Public Instruction, note 54 supra, at 286-87.
67 In concluding as I do that the public forum and public employment cases present
problems of equality rather than freedom, I do not mean to suggest that they can be resolved
by resort to the Equal Protection Clause alone. If we had no First Amendment, the level
of scrutiny that would be given classifications disfavoring some speakers would approximate
that given classifications disfavoring some recipients of AFDC benefits. See Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970). My point is, rather, that the Court has felt com-
pelled to talk in terms of equality, and indeed to invoke the Equal Protection Clause explicitly,
because its consistent understanding of the term "freedom" in the First Amendment (choice
proceeding from a motive that is not undesired) does not provide sufficient protection for the
values it sees underlying individual and political expression. "Freedom" so defined would
allow the government to buy unanimous support for orthodox opinions despite the obviously
unhealthy social consequences of such a program. See text at notes 86-88 infra.
6s In referring throughout this section and Sec. IV to the "neutrality" (or "equality")
principle, I do not wish to be understood as suggesting that neutrality is an adequate
description of the jurisprudence that the Supreme Court has adopted in Establishment Clause
cases. I make clear (e.g., text at notes 99, 113 infra) that it is not, though the state of the law
might be considerably improved if it were. It is enough for my purposes that neutrality is a
baseline principle which the Court has consistently reaffirmed. Roemer v. Maryland Public
Works Board, 426 U.S. 736, 746-47 (1976) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (opinion of Burger, C. J.); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664,
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explore that question here by looking at parallel types of affirmative
action that the Court has approved. One is benign racial classifica-
tion, a phenomenon to which Thimas bears obvious similarities, for
not only there, but in most recent cases, the Free Exercise Clause
"has functioned primarily to protect what must be counted as dis-
crete and insular minorities, such as the Amish, Seventh Day Ad-
ventists, and Jehovah's Witnesses. ' 69 The other is government
sponsorship of speech, a kind of "affirmative action" which the
Court has occasionally countenanced despite the general principle
of free-speech neutrality. That, too, has a family resemblance to the
unique support the Court gave religious objections in Thomas de-
spite the general neutrality principle of the Establishment Clause.
A. BENIGN DISCRIMINATION
In one way, the affirmative action that the Court took on behalf
of religious employees in Thomas is more radical than the benign
discrimination at stake in Bakke70 and Fuilove. 71 Thomas does not
simply say, as those cases did, that government may act to aid a
particular disadvantaged group; it says instead that government
must afford a special advantage to religious voluntary quitters. Such
mandatory affirmative action. makes sense if withholding benefits
actually restricts free exercise, 72 but as I assert in Section II, it does
not. If Indiana's law did not violate anyone's constitutional rights,
the decision about affirmative aid to religious minorities, just as the
decision about affirmative action on behalf of racial minorities,
should, as an institutional matter, be left to the discretion of the
legislature. That was the solution preferred by Justice Rehnquist in
669 (1970); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952); Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
69 ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 100 (1980).
70 University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
7' Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
72 An example of such a case is Wisconsin v. Yoder, note 29 supra. The Court there con-
cluded that the state's compulsory-education law restricted the free exercise rights of the
Amish and ordered that the Amish be allowed a religious exemption. In so doing the Court
consciously overrode the Establishment Clause principle that the government must give equal
treatment to religion and nonreligion. Id. at 220-21. See also Kurland, The Supreme Court,
Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 213,
236-37 (1973). I suggest in Sec. IV that the neutrality principle of the Establishment Clause
may be stated in such a way that it is consistent with the outcome in Yoder though not with
the results in Thomas and Sherbert.
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Thomas73 and by Justice Harlan in Sherbert. 74 1 think, however, that
by awarding benefits to Thomas, the Court not only undertook a
legislative task but also violated the Establishment Clause-just as
the State of Indiana would have done had it voluntarily enacted the
religious exemption which the Court said was constitutionally re-
quired.
If the Establishment Clause in fact states a kind of equality princi-
ple, the Rehnquist-Harlan position assumes that it tolerates benign
legislative intervention just as the Equal Protection Clause does re-
garding racial classifications. But the arguments that support
affirmative action in the latter case simply do not wash when
applied to religion.
One such argument, which goes to the substance of the harm
ca, ,ed by discrimination, maintains that the evil of racial
classifications is that they stigmatize the disfavored class. Because
that does not occur when whites are disadvantaged vis-a-vis blacks,
we need not demand exceptional reasons to uphold benign
classifications. 75 A second argument, really an evidentiary pre-
sumption, is that we need not be unusually suspicious of
classifications that disfavor the political majority because its mem-
bers are unlikely to hurt themselves without good reason. 76 A third
argument, defensive in nature, is that even if we look equally hard
at benign and malign discrimination, we can on occasion find com-
pelling enough reasons for approving the former.
One is tempted to leap at the first two as support for Indiana's
hypothetical religious exemption. After all, most Hoosiers will feel
no psychic or moral affront if Jehovah's Witnesses are given special
consideration. And it is hard to believe that a legislature in which
the Witnesses are hardly represented at all is gearing up for an
offensive on behalf of the Kingdom. But both those suggestions
ignore the fact that the exemption carved out by the Court favored
73 101 S. Ct. at 1435.
74 374 U.S. at 422.
75 Bakke, note 70supra, at 357-58, 374-75 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Dworkin, WhyBakke
Has No Case, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 11, 15-16 (November 10, 1977); Greenawalt,
Judicial Scrutiny of'Benign' Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559,
570-71 (1975).
7 See Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 723
(1974). That argument is what underlay Justice Brennan's emphasis in Bakke on the fact that
"whites as a class [do not] have any of the 'traditional indicia of suspectness .... ' Note 70
supra, at 357.
religions generally. The same would be true of any modification
that Indiana might make in its Employment Security Act. That
makes the second argument, the evidentiary presumption, untena-
ble: we may not be suspicious of classifications benefiting fringe
sects, but the collective forces of religion are another matter. It is a
rare legislator who has the temerity to disclaim a belief in God. The
general nature of the exemption also undercuts the first argument
by making the individual harm more substantive: the Establishment
Clause, no less than the Equal Protection Clause, is worried about
the psychic and moral affront from discrimination,7 7 and that evil is
likelier to ensue from general favoritism of religion than it is from
special consideration of a distinct minority like Jehovah's Wit-
nesses. The audience is more adult, but apart from that, the problem
is not too different from Engel v. Vitale,7 8 the Regents' Prayer Case.
In each situation, the state purposefully uses its resources in a non-
coercive and denominationally neutral fashion to favor its religious
7 I find it odd that this point has not received more attention than it has. That there is
such a stigmatic effect seems to me self-evident. Consider the trial testimony of Edward
Schempp, explaining why he did not have his children excused from voluntary school-prayer
services: "He said that he thought his children would be 'labeled as "odd balls"' before their
teachers and classmates every school day;.. . that today the word 'atheism' is often connected
with 'atheistic communism,' and had 'very bad' connotations, such as 'un-American' or
'anti-red,' with overtones of possible immorality." Abington School District v. Schempp,
note 68 supra, at 203, 208 n.3. See also id. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("even devout
children may . .. continue to participate in exercises distasteful to them because of an
understandable reluctance to be stigmatized as atheists or nonconformists"); Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("The complaint is that when others join and he does not, it sets him apart as a dissenter,
which is humiliating."). Such an impact makes perfectly understandable what has been seen
as a unique standing rule for Establishment Clause cases laid down in Scbhmpp, note 68 supra,
at 224 n.9. See Brown, "Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School-Prayer Cases," 1963 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 15-31. In fact, the rule is no different from that which we apply in equal
protection cases. In either instance, discrimination need not amount to coercion, that is to
say, to an interference with freedom, to provide a basis for standing. Suppose, e.g., that
instead of a prayer the class chanted "White is right" and blacks were allowed to leave the
room. That violates no constitutional freedom that I know of, but is certainly a denial of equal
protection, and a black student would undoubtedly have standing to complain. What is
more, in an action for injunctive relief, he would not have to prove harm to himself as a
factual element of his case. It is a fact ofwhich a court could take judicial notice. Compare Black,
The Lawfulney ofthe Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 426-28 (1960), with Brown, 1963 Sup.
CT. REv. at 30-31.
The psychic and moral affront from discrimination may also help explain the complemen-
tary standing rule applied in school aid cases. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The
problem of state aid to sectarian schools is structurally like the problem of state aid to private
segregated schools, and in the latter case no one has doubted the standing of black students
even though they were not taxpayers. See Norwood v. Harrison, 340 F. Supp. 1003, 1007
(N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, note 6 supra.
78 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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citizens over the nonreligious. InEngel, the state actually conducted
a religious exercise, whereas our hypothetical amendment funds the
performance of religious obligation. But, as the Court has argued in
a related context, the distinction between state conduct and state
funding is "a formalistic dichotomy that bears ... little relationship
... to common sense."
7 9
The third argument for sustaining benign racial discrimination,
defensive in nature, has been to look for compelling state interests
that will satisfy even the strictest scrutiny. The striking feature of
this approach is that the interests advanced are always in the service
of a longer-range equality. The claim is that race-conscious action is
necessary to achieve some end that pervasive societal discrimination
frustrates,80 and that such tactics will be unnecessary in a future,
more egalitarian, society.81 Neither contention can be made about a
religious exemption in Indiana's unemployment scheme. There is
simply no such thing as societal discrimination against religion gen-
erally,8 2 or even any suggestion in the Court's opinion that it was
saving Jehovah's Witnesses from the effects of a more focused and
local prejudice.83 More important still, the institution of a religious
exemption is not aimed at any future goal to make religion, like
race, irrelevant to decisions about labor relations. On the contrary,
it sets up the pursuit of religious options84 as a substantive good
7' Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 658
(1980).
80 Thus, Justice Powell in Fullilve argued that the minority business set-aside "serves the
compelling governmental interest in eradicating the continuing effects of past discrimination
identified by Congress." Note 71 supra, at 496. In Minnick v. California Department of
Corrections, 101 S. Ct. 2211 (198 1), the department contended that it had a compelling state
interest in increasing the number of minority correction officers in order to cope with racial
tensions in its prisons. Id. at 2215 & n. 11. Even Justice Powell's argument in Bakke that the
state had a compelling interest in pursuing the academic goal of a racially diverse student
body addresses a problem-the homogeneity of medical student bodies-which is the prod-
uct of past discrimination. Note 70supra, at 369-73 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
81 Bakke, note 70 supra, at 403 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); Dworkin, note 75 supra, at 11.
82 "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Zorach v.
Clauson, note 68 supra, at 313.
83 As far as the record shows, Thomas may have been the only Jehovah's Witness with a
complaint against the law. Thomas v. Review Board, note 7 supra, at 1128-29. Indeed, there
is a fair argument that the effect of the decision in Thomas will be to make employers less
willing to hire Jehovah's Witnesses then they were before. 101 S. Ct. at 1432.
84 I say "the pursuit of religious options" rather than "religious liberty" because, as Sec. II
makes clear, the latter is not affected by the Indiana Employment Security Act. What the
Court's decision does is to make more attractive one option-the religious one-which
Thomas was already free to pursue. See also text at notes 100-01 infra.
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which it will be no less important for the state to promote in the
future than it is now. But that is precisely what the Establishment
Clause is intended to prevent.85
B. PROTECTING FREEDOM AND PROMOTING CHOICES
The comparison with benign racial discrimination suggests not
only that the Court was wrong in Thomas and Sherbert, but that the
dissenters in those cases were also wrong to say that the state had a
wide zone within which it could act to accommodate religion. A
look at an even closer parallel-the companion Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment-provides no better support for the
Harlan-Rehnquist proposal. The equal protection theory of those
free speech cases discussed in Section II is anchored in a belief that
it is possible to reach a satisfactory equilibrium in a free speech
market. In part, the principle of governmental neutrality is
grounded on the trust that uninhibited discussion of public issues
will lead to informed decision making, avoid standardization of
ideas, and make government responsive to the will of the people.
8 6
In part, it is thought to allow a healthy type of social conflict
productive of consensus and stable change.8 7 Debate free from gov-
ernment influence is also crucial if scholarship is to flourish, science
to advance, and culture to build. 88 Each of those objectives can be
frustrated, as well, when the government offers or withholds finan-
cial inducements as when it engages in outright regulation. I argue
in Section II that fiscal manipulation did not interfere with freedom
of choice. That is not to say, however, that it does not affect the
outcome of choices. If every person has his price, then for a suitable
aggregate figure, the government can buy unanimity for any posi-
s "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government... can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another .... That Amendment requires the state to be a
neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers .... Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. at 15, 18.
86 Carey v. Brown, note 2supra, at 462-63,466-67; Pickering v. Board of Education, note
55supra, at 571-72; Cox v. Louisiana, note 57supra, at 551-52; Baggett v. Bullitt, note 54
supra, at 372 n. 10; Edwards v. South Carolina, note 57 supra, at 237-38; Cramp v. Board of
Public Instruction, note 54 supra, at 287-88.
87 Baggett v. Bullitt, note 54supra, at 372 n. 10; Edwards v. South Carolina, note 57supra,
at 237-38; Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, note 54supra, at 287-88.
58 Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, note 2 supra, at 95-96; Whitehill v. Elkins, note 54
supra, at 59-60; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, note 54supra, at 603; Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. at 486-87.
71 FREEDOM AND EQUALITY IN THE REuGION CLAUSES 215
tion it favors, regardless of the loss to science, scholarship, culture,
or informed and creative political decision-making.
There is, however, somewhat more latitude permitted the gov-
ernment when it enters the market as a participant rather than as a
regulator.8 9 That is particularly true when the state's entry into the
market is designed to preserve or enhance political expression
within a democratic system, though the same may be said of efforts
to expand the quality, range, and depth of freedom of expression
generally. 90 To take an example considered in Harris v. McRae9"
and Maher v. Roe, 92 it is improper for a state to prevent parents from
sending their children to private schools, but there is no restriction
on the state's ability to favor public education by funding it, 93 and
it would be fatuous to suggest that in designing public school cur-
ricula the state could not include civics courses which teach the
virtues of democracy and the evils of facism. A similar explanation
may be given for the holding in Buckley v. Valeo concerning public
financing of presidential election campaigns.94 The funding provi-
sions sustained there allow the distribution of unequal shares of the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund to "major," "minor," and
"new" parties. The practical effect of Chapter 95 is that a Republi-
can or a Democratic candidate will receive better than $20 million,
while a Communist or Nazi party candidate will receive nothing. 95
s1 There is a curious parallel to this aspect of free speech doctrine in the free trade theory
of the Commerce Clause. There, as with speech, discriminatory state regulation must meet
exacting state-interest and least-restrictive-alternative requirements. But when the state en-
ters the commercial market as participant rather than as regulator, the Court has been more
accommodating. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
90 An example of the latter is the legislation creating the Corporation for Public Broad-
casting. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 396 et seq. (Supp. 1981).
91 448 U.S. at 318.
92 432 U.S. at 476-77.
" Norwood v. Harrison, note 6 supra.
94 424 U.S. at 94-95.
"' Chapter 95 of Title 26 establishes a Presidential Election Campaign Fund, 26 U.S.C. §
9006, and provides that "major party" candidates in the general election shall be entitled to
$20 million, adjusted for inflation. See 26 U.S.C. § 9004(aX1). A "major party" is defined as
one whose candidate for president in the last election received 25 percent of the popular vote.
26 U.S.C. § 9002(6). A "minor party" is one whose candidate received 5 percent of the
popular vote in the last election. 26 U.S.C. § 9002(7). Minor party candidates are entitled to a
fraction of $20 million, determined by the ratio of the vote received by the party's candidate
in the last election to the average of the major party candidates. 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a)(2XA).
"New parties" include all other political parties. Their candidates receive no money before
the general election, but if they win 5 percent of the vote they are entitled to payments
according to the formula applicable to minor party candidates. 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a)(3).
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The Supreme Court concluded that the scheme enhanced, rather
than abridged, freedom of speech and so was consistent with the
First Amendment. For one thing, displacing private contributions
with public funding 96 made it more likely that political candidates
would be responsive to widely shared, rather than narrow but
financially powerful, opinions. 97 Thus, the Act would counteract
private distortions in the free speech market. And in deciding how
to divide up the fund, Congress could give more money to candi-
dates who took more popular positions, because that, like free
speech itself, tended to promote a democratic consensus. To treat
all candidates equally, in contrast, would spawn instability by
"'artificially foster[ing] the proliferation of splinter parties."' 98
If the theory of such cases is that the demands of government
neutrality may yield to the purpose of promoting free speech val-
ues, there is an obvious parallel in the current doctrine that the
Establishment Clause must yield where necessary to protect free
exercise values. As the Court said in Wisconsin v. Yoder:99
an exception from a general obligation of citizenship on religious
grounds may run afoul of the Establishment Clause, but that
danger cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no matter
how vital it may be to the protection of values promoted by the
right of free exercise.
To say that the Court was protecting free exercise values in Thomas
and in Sherbert, where there was no restriction of free exercise in the
first place, is just loose talk. It is important to distinguish between
protecting religious liberty, on the one hand, and promoting reli-
gious options, on the other. As I demonstrated in Section II, Yoder
96 In order to be eligible for funds a major party candidate must certify that he will accept
no private contributions except to the extent necessary to make up any deficiency in pay-
ments received out of the fund. 26 U.S.C. § 9003(bX2). Minor and new party candidates
must accept an expenditure ceiling and limit private contributions to an amount which, when
added to public funds, does not exceed that ceiling. 26 U.S.C. § 9003(c).
9 7 Id. at 91.
98 Id. at 98. A related phenomenon has been the willingness to sustain rules about access to
broadcast media over claims of interference with editorial discretion. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v.
FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813, 2829-30 (1981); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969). In such cases the government's role is regulatory rather than participatory, though the
permissibility of more active intervention is premised on the theory that the airwaves are a
"part of the public domain." CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. at 2829.
99 Wisconsin v. Yoder, note 29supra, at 205, 220-21. See also Sherbert v. Verner, note 25
supra, at 413-17 (Stewart, J., concurring); Everson v. Board of Education, note 68supra, at
17; TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 833-34 (1978); KAUPER, RELIGION AND
THE CONSTITUTION 71 (1964).
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was a type I case, in which the state compelled the Amish to choose
an option (school attendance, contrary to their religious belief that
the state preferred, under threat of fine or imprisonment for non-
compliance.' 00 That was a clear interference with religious liberty
in the sense that the state dictated the outcome of choice by sup-
plying an undesired motive (fear of sanctions). In contrast, the
Indiana Employment Security Act did not supply Thomas with
any motive he did not already have for keeping his job. But the
result of the Court's decision was to promote the contrary
option-the religious one-which Thomas was already free to pur-
sue.
It is on that distinction that the free speech comparison founders.
In the realm of expression, the government can not only protect
liberty but also promote particular options, such as preference for
democracy over fascism. Not so with religion:' 0 '
"Our constitutional policy . . .does not deny the value or the
necessity for religious training, teaching or observance. Rather it
secures their free exercise. But to that end it does deny that the
100 Text at note & note 29 supra.
101 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, note 68 supra, at 218-19, quoting Everson v.
Board of Education, note 68 supra, at 52 (Rutledge, J. dissenting). Note the Court's recogni-
tion of the same distinction in Buckley, where it rejected the suggestion that it read an
Establishment Clause into the free speech guarantee. Note 5 supra, at 92-93 & n.127.
It may be possible to justify a statutory "religious" exemption if it is drawn in terms broad
enough to cover everyone, including atheists and agnostics. Suppose that the law allows
unemployment compensation to anyone who sees quitting as a choice for or against religion,
so that an atheist whose job required her to assist in the manufacture of sacramental objects
would be entitled to collect benefits if she quit. Cf. Young v. Southwestern Savings and Loan
Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975). In that instance it makes some sense to argue that the
state is not promoting religious options but merely protecting religious liberty (i.e., choices
about religion, which might have positive or negative outcomes) against private restrictions.
To put it another way, such a law would be not a species of affirmative action but simply
another application of the principle of nondiscrimination. That is the aim of § 703(a)(1) of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), which provides that
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to... discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
...religion ....
The provision apparently extends to atheists, see Young supra; EEOC Dec. 72-1114, 4 F.E.P.
Cas. 842 (1972); 110 Cong. Rec. 2607 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler), and the Court has been
uneasy about finding in the law any duty to favor the religious over the nonreligious. See
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 85 (1977) ("we will not readily
construe the statute to require an employer to discriminate against some employees in order
to enable others to observe their Sabbath"). Of course, even if the law I have hypothesized
would be constitutional, it does not justify the Court's decision in Thomas, which says that
such a measure is not only permitted but required.
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state can undertake or sustain them in any form or degree. For
this reason the sphere of religious activity, as distinguished from
the secular intellectual liberties, has been given the two fold
protection and, as the state cannot forbid, neither can it perform
or aid in performing the religious function. The dual prohibition
makes that function altogether private."
IV. A RECONCILIATION OF THE FREE EXERCISE AND
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES
Taken together, Sections II and III yield what seem to be
two inconsistent principles about the relation of government and
religion. The conclusion of Section III is that the equality principle
of the Establishment Clause forbids the government to provide any
unequal benefit to religion. On the other hand, the discussion of
religious freedom in Section II suggests that a law applying to all
equally-like the school attendance law in Yoder-might violate the
Free Exercise Clause if it provided an undesired motive to refrain
from making a religious choice. Or, to turn it around, under some
circumstances the government might be required to give special
consideration to religion in order to protect free exercise. The ap-
parent conflict of those two propositions does not affect the resolu-
tion of Thomas, where free exercise was not involved, but I should
say a few words about the problem to show that I have not based
my criticism of the case on contradictory premises about the
meaning of religious freedom and equality.
Consistency depends on perspective. If one takes the perspective
that the First Amendment requires government to treat people
equally in all circumstances irrespective of their religious convictions,
the principles in Sections II and III seem to be polar opposites.
Such a reading of the religion clauses demands, as Philip Kur-
land has said, 10 2
that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or
inaction because these clauses prohibit classification in terms of
religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.
The free exercise principle of Section II is inconsistent with that
view because it sees some purely secular laws (like that in Yoder) as
restrictions on freedom and calls in appropriate cases for a religion-
102 See KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw 18 (1962).
FREEDOM AND EQUALITY IN THE REUGION CLAUSES 219
conscious solution. On the other hand, if we say, as Gail Merel
recently suggested, that the First Amendment requires government
to be neutral with respect to religious choices, the principles in Sections
II and III come into line.103 What the free exercise principle says
about cases like Yoder is that government may not affect the out-
come of religious choices by supplying a motive' 0 4 for refraining
from religious action. What the establishment principle says about
cases like Thomas is that government may not affect the outcome of
religious choices by supplying a motive for engaging in religious
action.
The difficulty with Professor Kurland's formulation of the neu-
trality principle is that, in an effort to reconcile the religion clauses,
it substitutes "equality" for "freedom" in the Free Exercise Clause
and thereby gives that guarantee a meaning significantly more nar-
row than the principle stated in Section 11.105 Laws such as "All
children must attend school" that make no classification along reli-
gious lines are seen as consistent with free exercise if they impose
no special burden on religious objectors.' 0 6 But when the Con-
stitution uses the words "free," "freedom," and "liberty," what it
guarantees is protection for individual choice to do or not to do a
particular thing.' 07 For example, a law that said "Everyone must
stay home after sundown" would abridge my right to freedom of
speech if I would otherwise choose to go to night school, or the
theater, or to address a Nazi party rally. It would be no excuse that
all people were treated alike. In the same way, requiring universal
attendance at school irrespective of religious convictions is a way of
treating everyone equally, but it restricts the free exercise of reli-
gion because it leaves only a Hobson's choice to those who see
school attendance as a religious issue.
The second perspective-government neutrality regarding reli-
gious choices-does not completely resolve the tension between the
two religion clauses, but it does reduce the area of conflict, and it
103 Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion under the
First Amendment, 45 U. CI1. L. REV. 805, 810-11 & nn.36, 37 (1978).
104 A motive which the individual would not choose. See text at note 33 supra.
105 Cf. Merel, note 103 supra, at 807-8.
106 Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 213 (1973).
107 See text supra at note & note 28.
justifies the theory of free exercise predominance'"° in cases where
they cannot be reconciled. The principle eliminates conflict be-
tween free exercise and establishment in public benefits cases (like
Thomas and Sherbert) by making clear that freedom is not at stake and
by enforcing the proscription against government supplying a mo-
tive for engaging in religious action. But it is impossible, if we are to
give 'free exercise" its full meaning, to blink the difficulty presented
by religious exemptions from laws imposing general obligations.
Take Wisconsin v. Yoder' 0 9 and Reynolds v. United StatesIII by way of
example. To refuse to allow an exemption from a compulsory
school-attendance law or an antipolygamy law is to provide the
Amish or the Mormons with an undesired motive (fear of fine and
imprisonment) to make a choice which violates their religious con-
victions. But to allow an exemption for those with religious scruples
is to provide a motive (an opportunity to skip school, a chance to get
married twice) for the nonreligious to get religion. The problem
dissolves under current doctrine if the state can prove a compelling
interest in uniform enforcement,"' but that solution will be rare. A
second possibility is to make school attendance voluntary and re-
peal restrictions on multiple marriages; but to do that for every law
to which someone could interpose a religious objection would be
monstrously impractical. The best we can hope for, if we are still to
run a government, is to minimize the effect on the outcome of
108 See text supra at note & note 99.
109 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
110 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
1I The principle that the government may not supply a motive for refraining from reli-
gious action is not absolute. What it means is that when the government prevents (see note 28
supra), compels (case 1), forbids, or deters (case 2) a particular religious choice, it must have a
compelling reason to justify the restriction on religious freedom. See Yoder, note 29supra, at
215. For example, a draft with no religious exemption might be justified by military neces-
sity. The received learning has it that the state must also prove its law is the least restrictive
alternative. Ibid. Cf. Thomas, 101 S. Ct. at 1432.
HowReynold would fare when measured against these exacting contemporary standards is
not clear. It is possible that the Court would relax the demands made on the state along the
lines suggested in Braunfeld v. Brown, note 30 supra, at 599, 603-04: "The freedom to hold
religious beliefs and opinions is absolute .... However, the freedom to act, even when the
action is in accord with one's religious convictions, is not totally free from legislative restric-
tions.... As pointed out in Reynolds v. United States .... legislative power.. . may reach
people's actions when they are found to be in violation of important social duties or subver-
sive of good order, even when the actions are demanded by one's religion." But the
significance of the state's interest in preventing polygamy is cast in some doubt by the Court's
recent approval of nontraditional family relationships. See cases cited in Developments in the
Law, the constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1279 nn. 163-66 (1980).
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religious choices by requiring the state to take the approach that has
the least influence on religious choices. And that will invariably
dictate a preference for protecting free exercise. One reason is that
any well-written law imposing a general obligation will attach
penalties which make obedience more attractive than violation. It is
more unpleasant to go to jail, for example, than to go to school or to
avoid multiple marriages. That means that the motive for aban-
doning religious convictions (fear of imprisonment) which results
from uniform enforcement is stronger than the motive for adopting
a religious position (dislike of school or monogamy) which results
from an exemption. A second reason, contingent though it is, will
also often be persuasive. It is undeniable that there is an element of
self-interest in complying with most laws (going to school, avoiding
polygamy), but there is none in paying a fine or going to jail; and to
the degree to which complying with the law is appealing in itself,
making a religious exemption will not provide a motive for people
to adopt a faith they would not buy for its own merits.
The second perspective is also consistent with those Estab-
lishment Clause cases holding that the state can provide bene-
fits to religion provided they are no different from the benefits given
to competing nonreligious choices. Providing free bus transpor-
tation to parochial schoolchildren does not affect the balance of
motives for choosing a religious school if free rides are also given to
the public schoolchildren. 112 Of couse, the cases concerning school
aid hold that there is something more at issue than neutrality under
the Establishment Clause. But tacking on an entanglement codicil
to the general neutrality principle does not affect what I have said
about free exercise, so I can safely leave to others the decision
whether that is a good idea. 1 13
112 See Everson v. Board of Education, note 68supra, at 18. Cf. Walz v. Tax Commission,
note 68 supra, at 664, 672-73; id. at 696-97 (Harlan, J., concurring).
113 For suggestions that the entanglement test has not been a notable success see Choper,
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673
(1980); Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
and the Supreme Court, 24 VILLANOVA L. REV. 3, 19-20 (1978).

